Events
The Newark Riot of 1967 began with the arrest of a cab driver named John
Smith, who allegedly drove around a double-parked police car at the
corner of 7th St. and 15th Avenue. He was subsequently stopped, interrogated,
arrested and transported to the 4th precinct headquarters, during which
time he was severely beaten by the arresting officers. As news of the
arrest spread, a crowd began to assemble in front of the precinct house,
located directly across from a high-rise public housing project. When
the police allowed a small group of civil rights leaders to visit the
prisoner, they demanded that Mr. Smith be taken to a hospital. Emerging
from the building, these civil rights leaders begged the crowd to stay
calm, but they were shouted down. Rumor spread that John Smith had died
in police custody, despite the fact he had been taken out the back entrance
and transported to a local hospital. Soon a volley of bricks and bottles
was launched at the precinct house and police stormed out to confront
the assembly. As the crowd dispersed they began to break into stores
on the nearby commercial thoroughfares. Eventually violence spread from
the predominantly black neighborhoods of Newark's Central Ward to Downtown
Newark, and the New Jersey State Police were mobilized. Within 48 hours,
National Guard troops entered the city. With the arrival of these troops
the level of violence intensified. At the conclusion of six days of
rioting 23 people lay dead, 725 people were injured and close to 1500
people had been arrested.
Causes of the Newark Riot
A variety of factors contributed to the Newark Riot, including police
brutality, political exclusion of blacks from city government, urban
renewal, inadequate housing, unemployment, poverty, and rapid change
in the racial composition of neighborhoods.
Police-Community Relations
For residents of Newark’s predominantly black Central Ward, the
police were a persistent, if not entirely welcome presence. Patrolmen,
who were mostly of Irish and Italian descent routinely stopped and questioned
black youths with or without provocation. During the decade preceding
the riot, several high profile cases of police brutality against young
black men were reported, some resulting in death. In July 1965, Lester
Long, aged 22, was shot and killed by police after a “routine”
traffic stop. A few weeks later, Bernard Rich, a 26-year old African-American
male, died in police custody under mysterious circumstances while locked
in his jail cell. On Christmas eve that year, Walter Mathis, aged 17,
was fatally wounded by an “accidental” weapons discharge
while being searched for illegal contraband. Despite calls for the appointment
of a civilian police review board and hiring of more African American
policemen, such proposals went unheeded. Police-related shootings and
beatings for the most part were not prosecuted; Few cases of police
abuse in Newark ever made it to a jury.
Political Exclusion
The mutual suspicion and hostility that characterized the relationship
between black citizens and the police in Newark were matched by feelings
of political powerlessness and acrimony toward political officials.
Black residents of Newark were not only underrepresented on the police
force, but were also sorely absent from the corridors of political power.
This disparity of political power was self-evident in Newark, when Mayor
Hugh Addonizio, who had professed sensitivity to black concerns during
his election campaign, failed to appoint blacks to leadership positions
in his administration. Most tellingly was the manner with which the
mayor handled a school board vacancy by appointing an Irish high school
graduate, Councilman James T. Callaghan over Wilbur Parker, the first
African-American certified public accountant in the State of New Jersey.
Further contention resulted over the administration of federal anti-poverty
funds. As part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, the
federal government sought to channel funds to community groups in poor
neighborhoods as a means of empowering poor people to address local
social problems. Utilizing these funds, the black community began to
organize politically. When federal anti-poverty funds were cut back,
militant leaders like Amiri Baraka, then known as Leroi Jones began
to speak of revolution.
Urban Renewal
In Newark, “urban renewal” or “Negro removal”
as it was referred to by local residents, would play an important role
in fomenting rebellion. Plans were already in place to build superhighways
which would bisect the black community. Then in the early months of
1967 the city proposed the “clearance” of 150 acres of “slum”
land to build a medical school/hospital complex. Of course, this would
involve the demolition of numerous homes in the predominantly black
Central Ward. Given the shortage of housing in other areas, the effects
of such displacement were potentially devastating. Activist Tom Hayden
succinctly summarized the resident’s fears:
“The city’s vast programs for urban renewal, highways, downtown
development, and most recently, a 150 acre Medical School in the heart
of the ghetto seemed almost deliberately designed to squeeze out this
rapidly growing Negro community that represents a majority of the population”
(Hayden 1968:6) Upon hearing of the proposal, members of the local community
quickly mobilized and began to hold protest rallies. Some of the same
people who attended these rallies were present at the 4th precinct house,
when the riot started that summer. The city’s plan to build the
medical school, while demolishing black occupied homes, helped set the
stage for future confrontation.
Unemployment and Poverty
Amidst a backdrop of police brutality and housing crisis, a profound
change was underway in the economic structure of cities like Newark
and Detroit. By the late 1960s both cities were caught in the throes
of industrial decline, for which black workers bore the brunt. The flight
of manufacturing jobs, which had begun in the 1950s, accelerated during
the 1960s. In Newark, the famed breweries that drew water from the polluted
Passaic River shut down, as did the tanneries which fouled the water
to begin with. The big conglomerates, Westinghouse and General Electric,
who manufactured large appliances in Newark soon followed. In their
wake, thousands of jobs were lost.
As a result of previous discrimination and poor education, black workers,
who were concentrated in heavy industry, felt the impact of these changes
more than white workers who had moved upward into managerial and professional
jobs. But it was black youth, just entering the labor market, who seemed
to have suffered the most in the long run. The Hughes Commission (1968)
stated the following grim statistics. Among 16-19 year old Negro men,
more than a third—37.8% were jobless. “Aggravating the growing
deficit of resources even further was the postwar abandonment by industry,
leaving fewer employment opportunities nearby for the lower skilled
and unskilled who remained in or came into the city. Stripped of much
of its leadership and other resources and faced with problems from before
and after the war, the city came to be like a house ransacked”
(Wright p57)
Housing
The quality and availability of housing was a major source of contention
among black residents and government officials. A public opinion survey
by the Governor’s Select Commission on Civil Disorder in New Jersey,
otherwise known as the Hughes Commission, revealed that 54% of black
respondents indicated that “housing problems had a ‘great
deal to do with the riot’” Much of the existing housing
in Newark during the mid-to late 1960s was uninhabitable by modern safety
and health standards. The city’s own application for the Model
Cities program in 1966 “described over 40,000 of the city’s
136,000 housing units as substandard or dilapidated”. (Report
for Action 1968:55) Slumlords collected rent but often failed to perform
regular maintenance, let alone improvements, to their properties. (Sternlieb
1969). Sometimes landlords simply set fire to their property in hope
of receiving an insurance windfall. Between 1961 and 1967 Newark averaged
3620 structural fires per year. (Winters 1979:5). Due to their limited
housing options, blacks in Newark paid more money for lesser quality
domiciles. Public housing in Newark merely helped concentrate poverty
and despair in one centralized location, further isolating the black
poor from the society at large.
Demographic Change
In Newark, as a result of post-war suburban migration, the white population
plummeted to approximately 158,000 in 1967 from 363,000 in 1950 and
266,000 in 1960. Correspondingly, the black population of Newark rose
from 70,000 in 1950 to 125,000 in 1960 and an estimated 220,000 in 1967.
By 1967, a majority of Newark residents (55%) were African-American.
Demographic changes at the city level, were reflected in particular
neighborhoods, namely the Central Ward, formerly home to a sizable concentration
of immigrant and second generation Jews. Abandoning their homes and
synagogues, these Jews, along with some Poles and Italians, fled for
the suburbs of nearby South Orange, West Orange, and Livingston. By
the time of the riot, the Central Ward was a predominantly black neighborhood,
yet served by mostly Jewish owned businesses--- a recipe for ethnic
tension. With respect to Newark in the 1960s Dr. Nathan Wright Jr. stated,
“All societies strive more for order than for orderly but needed
changes. Thus it would seem immediately fallacious to deny that gross
discrimination did not exist in a city that has moved from an 85 percent
white urban oriented majority in 1940 to a nearly 60 percent black,
strongly rural oriented black majority in 1965. Newark has been—and
is—the scene of massive urban change. Such change brings disorganization”
(Wright p8) Riot fatalities in Newark were concentrated in neighborhoods
that had experiences the most rapid rate of black in-migration and white
outmigration during the previous decade.